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TOO MANY ALERTS, TOO MUCH LIABILITY: SORTING 
THROUGH THE MALPRACTICE IMPLICATIONS OF DRUG-DRUG 
INTERACTION CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT 
M. SUSAN RIDGELY AND MICHAEL D. GREENBERG* 
INTRODUCTION 
Under provisions of the Health Information Technology for Economic 
and Clinical Health Act of 2009 (“HITECH”),1 the federal government is 
undertaking a national campaign to bring health information technology to 
every hospital and health care practice in the country.  As a part of that 
campaign, the federal government intends to accelerate the use of 
computer-based clinical decision support (“CDS”) interventions to facilitate 
the practice of evidence-based medicine.2 CDS systems, such as those that 
warn of drug-drug interactions or drug allergies, use patient-specific 
information to enhance clinical decision-making at the point of care.3  
Medication use is one of the most common and fundamental targets for 
CDS applications, and medication-related CDS has been shown to improve 
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Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law; A.B., Cornell University; M.A., Duke 
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 1. The Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health (HITECH) Act 
comprises Title XIII of Division A and Title IV of Division B of the American Recovery Act (ARRA) 
of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115, 226 (to be codified in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C.). 
 2. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, EVIDENCE ON THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF HEALTH 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 15 (2008), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/91xx/doc91 
68/05-20-healthit.pdf. 
 3. Eta S. Berner, Ethical and Legal Issues in the Use of Health Information Technology to 
Improve Patient Safety, 20 HEC Forum 243, 251 (2008). 
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safety, quality and efficiency.4  In order to promote quick adoption, the 
HITECH Act authorizes incentive payments for the “meaningful use” of 
certified electronic health record technology that includes CDS 
functionality.5 However, the robustness of this program will depend on the 
development of solutions to address existing barriers to the widespread 
adoption of CDS. 
Despite the evidence of its potential effectiveness, adoption of CDS by 
health care organizations and professionals is limited. Wider adoption has 
been held back by a variety of significant socio-technical barriers, such as 
difficulty developing clinical practice guidelines that can be readily and 
unambiguously translated into a computable form, challenges in integrating 
decision support into the clinical workflow, the poor specificity of CDS alerts, 
and poor support for CDS in commercially available electronic health 
record (“EHR”) systems. In particular, a number of user organizations have 
complained that commercially developed knowledge bases that underpin 
CDS systems “generate excessive number[s] of alerts, many of which are 
clinically unhelpful.”6 
In principle, physician adoption of CDS can be expected to improve 
medication safety. Because it helps prevent medical errors, effective CDS 
should inherently reduce liability.  Unfortunately, not all implementations of 
CDS are good. CDS software that overwhelms physicians with large 
numbers of clinically insignificant drug-drug interaction alerts, thus causing 
them to “tune out” is inherently liability enhancing. “Alert fatigue” may lead 
physicians to ignore or turn off drug-drug interaction alerts, even though 
CDS software creates an audit trail to show that physicians have done so.7 
These sorts of liability concerns could prevent this technology from achieving 
 
 4. ETA S. BERNER, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUALITY (AHRQ), AHRQ 
PUBLICATION NO. 09-0069-EF, CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT SYSTEMS: STATE OF THE ART 6 
(2009). 
 5. HITECH Act § 4101, 123 Stat. at 467, 470 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4).  The 
HITECH Act specifies three main components of “meaningful use”: (1) the use of certified EHR 
in a meaningful manner; (2) the use of certified EHR technology for electronic exchange of 
health information; and (3) the use of certified EHR technology to submit clinical quality and 
other measures.  Id.; CMS EHR Meaningful Use Overview, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID 
SERVICES, https://www.cms.gov/EHRIncentivePrograms/30_Meaningful_Use.asp (last visited 
Feb. 12, 2012). 
 6. Gilad J. Kuperman et al., Using Commercial Knowledge Bases for Clinical Decision 
Support: Opportunities, Hurdles and Recommendations, 13 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 
369, 369 (2006) [hereinafter Kuperman et al., Commercial Knowledge Bases]. 
 7. The audit trail in electronic systems is generally better at capturing data than in 
traditional paper systems. Arnold J. Rosoff, On Being a Physician in the Electronic Age: Peering 
into the Mists at Point-&-Click Medicine, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 111, 120 (2002); see also 
Michael Greenberg & M. Susan Ridgely, Clinical Decision Support and Malpractice Risk, 306 
JAMA 90, 90 (2011). 
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full adoption and therefore its potential benefit–which is to make patients in 
United States health care institutions safer by reducing the risks of 
medication error. 
The health IT (“HIT”) vendor market has not produced a solution to 
over-inclusive drug-drug interaction (“DDI”) warnings, or to the well-
documented problem of physician alert fatigue. As a result, CDS currently 
runs the risk of contributing to increased provider liability, but without 
improving the safety of patients: a perverse result for all concerned.  What is 
needed is an optimized DDI list, but vendors are unlikely to produce one, 
given their concern that excluding any potential drug interactions from the 
list (or allowing their clients to do so) exposes the vendor to additional 
liability risk. 
The National Coordinator for Health Information Technology (“ONC”) 
is addressing this problem, and a wide range of barriers to the adoption 
and use of CDS, through the Advancing Clinical Decision Support project, 
with a particular focus on making CDS ready to function under the HITECH 
2013 meaningful use requirements.8  Advancing Clinical Decision Support 
project leaders (RAND Corporation and Partners Health Care of 
Massachusetts) are tasked by the ONC with producing a consensus-driven, 
clinically significant DDI list that can be vetted for widespread adoption.9 
Despite the fact that there is practically no case law on the subject, the risk 
of liability generates anxiety in the provider and vendor communities and 
concern in policy circles. Unless liability concerns are addressed, vendors 
may continue to resist implementing a less-than-all-inclusive DDI list within 
their CDS software, while physicians and institutions may be reluctant to 
adopt CDS software that neglects to reduce their own risk.  Thus, part of the 
answer to CDS adoption problems involves untying the knot of liability issues 
surrounding the DDI list. 
Our discussion addressing this critical public policy issue is organized as 
follows. In Part I, we briefly describe CDS and DDI lists–the potential benefits 
and risks posed by their use and outline the liability concerns driving the 
public debate.10 In Part II, we review the fundamentals of medical 
malpractice liability and product liability (as it concerns medical software) 
and discuss what legal theory and existing case law suggest about how 
courts might treat CDS, and in particular a clinically significant DDI list.11 
This material provides necessary context for Part III, in which we identify and 
assess the relative merits of five public policy strategies for establishing 
 
 8. Advancing Clinical Decision Support, RAND HEALTH, http://www.rand.org/health/ 
projects/clinical-decision-support.html (last visited Jan. 22, 2012). 
 9. Id. 
 10. See infra pp. 260-264. 
 11. See infra pp. 264-278. 
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liability protection for providers who use a clinically significant DDI list and 
the vendors who develop applications that incorporate it.12  In Part IV, we 
summarize and make recommendations.13 
I.  CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT AND DDI 
The Institute of Medicine’s landmark report on patient safety, To Err is 
Human, estimated that medical errors may be responsible for as many as 
98,000 deaths in the United States each year and may cost the healthcare 
system up to $29 billion.14  A substantial number of these errors are 
medication errors.15  When prescribed inappropriately, medications can 
cause serious harm–including drug-drug interactions that can be lethal.16 
Electronic prescribing systems include DDI alerts as a form of clinical 
decision support to warn prescribers of potentially harmful drug 
combinations to help them avoid or mitigate patient harm. A systematic 
review of the literature conducted by Dorr and colleagues in 2007 
determined that several HIT components, including HER and CDS, were 
associated with improved care and positive patient outcomes.17  A recent 
review of the empirical literature identified ten studies that described how 
CDS affected adverse drug event (“ADE”) rates.18 Of these ten studies, half 
reported that implementation of CDS significantly reduced the rate of ADEs, 
four reported a non-significant reduction, and one reported no change.19 
 
 12. See infra pp. 278-293. 
 13. See infra pp. 293-295. 
 14. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: 
BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 1-2 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000). 
 15. See generally David W. Bates et al., Relationship Between Medication Errors and 
Adverse Drug Events, 10 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 199 (1995) (discussing the prevalence of 
medical errors). 
 16. Gilad J. Kuperman et al., Medication-related Clinical Decision Support in 
Computerized Order Entry Systems: A Review, 14 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 29, 29 
(2007) [hereinafter Kuperman et al., Computerized Order Entry Systems]. 
 17. See generally David Dorr et al., Informatics Systems to Promote Improved Care for 
Chronic Illness: A Literature Review, 14 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 156 (2007) (revealing 
a positive impact of specific health information technology components on chronic illness 
care). It is important to note, however, that most of the CDS shown to be useful was 
“homegrown” by large institutions such as academic medical centers that invested significant 
resources in developing their own medication knowledge base rather than purchasing from 
commercial vendors. As noted by Kuperman and colleagues, the knowledge base vendor 
market at that time (2007) was “immature.” See Kuperman et al., Computerized Order Entry 
Systems, supra note 16, at 38. 
 18. See Jesse I. Wolfstadt et al., The Effect of Computerized Physician Order Entry with 
Clinical Decision Support on the Rates of Adverse Drug Events: A Systematic Review, 23 J. 
GEN. INTERNAL MED. 451, 451 (2008). 
 19. Id. 
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RAND Corporation researchers addressed this question as well in a 
landmark modeling study estimating the potential impact of HIT systems on 
the United States healthcare system.20  Hillestad and his colleagues 
projected that a 90% adoption level of HIT in the United States could 
prevent up to 200,000 ADEs, and accrue as much as $81 billion in annual 
savings, over fifteen years.21 The same study indicated that the capacity of 
HIT systems to promote best practices, target preventative interventions, and 
improve chronic disease management could potentially double the amount 
saved.22  This is not to suggest that CDS can prevent all medication errors, 
but such systems hold the promise of reducing a substantial number of ADEs 
by introducing automation at the time of ordering and by supplying “speedy, 
available, and usable algorithms that provide parsimonious, clear, concise 
and actionable warnings and advice.”23 CDS can aid health care 
professionals by “automating cognitive aspects of healthcare” in effect, 
“turn[ing] the blizzard of available input data–from highly structured claims 
data, lab reports, patient facts and pharmacy records–into information [they] 
can use to improve practices.”24 
CDS is not without limitations, however. In a 2007 review of the 
literature, Kuperman and colleagues noted that a high percentage of 
prescribing orders result in alerts being generated by CDS systems (11% in 
one study) and that clinicians continued with their order in 88% of cases.”25  
In another study clinicians categorized only one in nine alerts as helpful 
when questioned at the time of the alert.26  Other studies have also 
documented extremely high override rates (89%).27 Reviewers caution that 
clinically significant drug-drug interaction alerts are “buried in a sea of 
unimportant messages.”28 Information overload undermines the purpose of 
having automated alerts in the first place, which is to prevent adverse events 
and make patients safer. 
One proposed solution is for hospitals and other provider organizations 
to customize knowledge bases supplied by vendors in order to improve the 
technology’s performance and acceptability.  However, vendor-supplied 
 
 20. Richard Hillestad et al., Can Electronic Medical Record Systems Transform Health 
Care? Potential Health Benefits, Savings and Costs, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 1104 (2005). 
 21. Id. at 1103, 1105, 1107, 1109. 
 22. Id. at 1114. 
 23. Kuperman et al., Computerized Order Entry Systems, supra note 16, at 29. 
 24. Jonathan K. Gable, An Overview of the Legal Liabilities Facing Manufacturers of 
Medical Information Systems, 5 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L.J. 127, 135 (2001). 
 25. Kuperman et al., Computerized Order Entry Systems, supra note 16, at 33. 
 26. Jeffrey R. Spina et al., Clinical Relevance of Automated Drug Alerts From the 
Perspective of Medical Providers, 20 AM. J. MED. QUALITY 7, 11 (2005). 
 27. Kuperman et al., Computerized Order Entry Systems, supra note 16, at 33. 
 28. Id. 
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software is not typically designed with local modification in mind, and 
knowledge base suppliers discourage providers from making 
modifications.29 The software itself often allows little flexibility for 
modification.30 In addition, vendors often use contracts to shift liability risks 
to providers in connection with any modification of CDS systems through 
liability limitations, indemnity, and disclaimer of warranty provisions.31 
Perhaps, then, the ideal policy goal is to encourage both providers and 
vendors to come together around optimized CDS systems that incorporate 
highly functional but non-comprehensive DDI lists.  Both provider liability 
and vendor liability will need to be considered in any effort to make this 
optimal technology solution come about. 
A. Untying the Liability Knot 
The development of a clinically significant DDI list and its 
implementation in clinical decision support systems poses some difficult 
liability questions for health care providers.  Does the use of CDS involve 
any incremental malpractice risk for the physicians who opt to use the 
technology?  If so, what is the nature of that risk?  How is the law likely to 
regard a clinically significant DDI list, and how would it comport with 
existing malpractice standards of care?  Are liability risks to physicians 
potentially influenced by the role of CDS software manufacturers and 
commercial knowledge base vendors in designing the new technology, and 
perhaps in turn, by hospitals in purchasing, implementing and training 
physicians in the use of the technology?  Should the federal government 
take a greater role in regulating CDS software as a medical device?  Should 
Congress create a safe harbor to insulate providers from tort liability for 
relying upon a clinically significant DDI list? 
The liability implications of developing a clinically significant DDI list are 
important, because the DDI list serves as a key element in helping to build 
better CDS technology.  In turn, improvement in CDS technology should 
incentivize physicians and hospitals to adopt it more rapidly and more 
widely.  Better CDS software that does not generate provider alert fatigue 
through over-abundant warnings should be easier to use, more effective in 
preventing adverse events, and more likely to reduce provider malpractice 
risk. 
How is CDS technology relevant to physician malpractice risk?  The 
answer depends partly on whether a DDI list is not overly inclusive, and yet 
is accurate for the majority of clinical situations.  A good DDI list will not 
 
 29. See id. 
 30. See Kuperman et al., Commercial Knowledge Bases, supra note 6, at 369-70. 
 31. Elisabeth Belmont & Adele A. Waller, The Role of Information Technology in Reducing 
Medical Errors, 36 J. HEALTH L. 615, 620-21 (2003). 
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generate alert fatigue, and CDS will help physicians catch some medication 
errors that otherwise might go undetected.  That is an inherently liability 
reducing result.  Even so, one could still ask whether CDS technology might 
create some new incremental liability problems for providers, perhaps with 
regard to unalerted, low-likelihood forms of drug interaction.32 
A different situation is posed by CDS software built atop an overly-
inclusive DDI list.  Such software will give warnings for a much larger class 
of potentially adverse events, but far less effectively, because physicians will 
become rapidly desensitized to overly abundant warnings.  Presumably, such 
CDS will increase physician liability risk, since automated warnings will be 
less helpful in reducing errors, even while the system creates an audit trail 
for ignored CDS warnings.  It is easy to see why providers worry about the 
potential effect on malpractice.  It is also easy to see that providers would 
have a disincentive to adopt new CDS technology in this case, and that 
patients also stand to benefit less from ineffective CDS–or even be harmed. 
How can policymakers best encourage development and adoption of 
CDS systems?  Is it by changing the law to directly protect providers against 
liability risk?  Or instead by finding ways to ensure that CDS works well, that 
automated drug warnings are not over-inclusive, and that CDS software 
therefore will be liability reducing for providers?  Our initial intuition is that 
there is no legal magic bullet for solving the provider liability problems 
connected with CDS adoption.  Although we surely could write new legal 
protections against malpractice risk connected with CDS, it is not clear that 
such protections are likely to be necessary if CDS is well implemented, or 
helpful if it is not. 
An important part of the real world problem around CDS is that vendors 
are also worried about liability risk.  The vendors’ lawyers are advising them 
that they could be at risk if missing drug interactions could later become the 
focus for liability claims.33  As a result, vendors are creating CDS systems 
that generate massively over-inclusive automated warnings.34  Vendors also 
try to protect themselves from risk via contracts with provider organizations 
 
 32. Superficially, the liability risk connected with CDS and exotic forms of drug interaction 
seems low.  Keep in mind that adverse drug events (ADEs) that go undetected by a physician 
using CDS would presumably also go undetected by the same physician not using CDS.  
Incremental liability risk to the physician only occurs if the presence of the CDS system 
somehow changes the standard of care, or else captures evidence of negligence that 
otherwise wouldn’t be available to plaintiff.  Where a hypothetical DDI list has widespread 
acceptance and endorsement in the provider community, it is likely that the list itself would 
become an element of the standard of care and therefore, the failure of CDS to give warnings 
for interactions not included on a consensus based DDI list would be unlikely, in itself, to 
create new liability risk for the physician. 
 33. See Kuperman et al., Commercial Knowledge Bases, supra note 6, at 370. 
 34. Greenberg & Ridgely, supra note 7, at 90. 
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(e.g., hospitals) that do not allow the end-users to modify the severity levels 
of DDI warnings.  Such limitations may help protect the vendors from risk for 
one category of potential tort claims, but the drawback is that it contributes 
to CDS systems that are not practical to use and not helpful to providers.  
From the physician’s point of view, bad CDS systems may be worse than 
nothing because they could make it impossible for physicians to pay 
attention to all of the automated warnings, while simultaneously compiling 
evidence that those warnings were given and ignored.  This scenario 
represents a “Catch-22” for health care providers and a deterrent to 
adoption of CDS technology. 
II.  WHEN SOMETHING GOES WRONG, WHO IS LIABLE? 
Evidence from the literature suggests that development and deployment 
of a clinically significant DDI list within an effective CDS system should 
improve prescribing accuracy, reduce errors, and be less likely to generate 
alert fatigue.35  If that is true, such a list should be liability reducing because 
one of the major drawbacks of current drug-drug interaction checking will 
be eliminated (or at least greatly reduced).  We believe this position is 
supported by legal theory, if not by existing case law, as we will explain later 
in this section.36 
Below we briefly review the kinds of liability risk borne by the major 
stakeholders that must come to terms to solve this problem: the physicians 
and other medical providers; the hospitals and other healthcare 
organizations; and the CDS software manufacturers and medical knowledge 
base vendors. 
A. Risk Borne By Physicians: Negligence 
Typically, when patients suffer harm as the result of negligent37 medical 
care, they are entitled to pursue compensation for medical malpractice 
through the tort system. State laws establish the fundamental basis for tort 
liability in medical malpractice and set out the rules for litigation.38  In 
principle, the tort system has two objectives: to compensate for injuries to 
patients, when those injuries have resulted from substandard care or 
malfeasance on the part of medical providers, and to deter negligence. 
 
 35. Kuperman et al., Computerized Order Entry Systems, supra note 16, at 29. 
 36. See infra p. 269. 
 37. A negligent act is “one from which an ordinarily prudent person would foresee such 
an appreciable risk of harm to others as to cause him not to do the act, or to do it in a more 
careful manner.”  BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (3d ed. 1969).  Physicians are liable for 
harm to patients even if unintentionally caused, if their conduct was unreasonable. 
 38. MICHELLE M. MELLO, THE ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., RESEARCH SYNTHESIS 
REPORT NO. 8, UNDERSTANDING MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: A PRIMER 5 (2006). 
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When a physician is sued for the death or injury of a patient resulting from 
side effects of a drug the physician prescribed, courts apply rules related to 
medical malpractice.39 
Malpractice liability is premised on a professional standard of care, as 
defined by the experience and training of a hypothetical “prudent physician” 
and by the actions that physician would take if confronted by a particular 
clinical situation and set of circumstances.40  In order to prevail in a medical 
malpractice action, the plaintiff must prove the following: (1) that the 
physician owed a duty of care to the patient; (2) that the duty was breached 
by the physician’s negligent act; (3) that the patient was harmed; and (4) 
that the negligence of the physician was the proximate cause of the harm to 
the patient.41 
Contrary to popular belief, the vast majority of patients who experience 
a medical error do not sue42 and those plaintiffs who do sue prevail in only 
a relatively small percentage of cases (about 20%).43 Also contrary to 
popular belief, empirical evidence suggests that the national volume of 
malpractice claims has declined in recent years.44 
Under the law, a physician is not required to provide superior care, but 
rather care that is typical of physicians in that particular locale (known as the 
community standard) or typical of the average physician across the nation 
(the rule in most jurisdictions).45  The standard of care is established by 
 
 39. See Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Malpractice: Physician’s Liability for Injury or Death 
Resulting from Side Effects of Drugs Intentionally Administered to or Prescribed for Patient, 47 
A.L.R.5TH 433, 451 (1997). 
 40. PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 187 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 
1984). 
 41. Id. at 164-65. 
 42. MELLO, supra note 38, at 7; see generally Troyen A. Brennan et al., Incidence of 
Adverse Events and Negligence in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical 
Practice Study I, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370 (1991); Lucian L. Leape et al., The Nature of 
Adverse Events in Hospitalized Patients: Results of the Harvard Medical Practice Study II, 324 
NEW ENG. J. MED. 377 (1991). 
 43. NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC 
REWARDS IN MEDICAL MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER MICRA 51 (2004) 
(citing the California jury verdicts for medical malpractice cases). 
 44. HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL 
PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: 2004 ANNUAL REPORT 24 (2004); HEALTH RES. & SERVS. ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK: 2006 ANNUAL REPORT 
26 (2006); AON INC., HOSPITAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY AND PHYSICIAN LIABILITY: 2006 
BENCHMARK ANALYSIS 5 (2006). 
 45. Randolph A. Miller & Sarah M. Miller, Legal and Regulatory Issues Related to the Use 
of Clinical Software in Health Care Delivery, in CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT: THE ROAD AHEAD 
423, 424 (Robert W. Greenes ed., 2007). A minority of jurisdictions follow the Helling v. 
Carey rule which states that physicians may be found negligent even if following national 
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expert testimony, and evidence (such as relevant clinical practice guidelines 
developed by professional organizations) may be presented.46 
If particular clinical practices, including those involving the use of health 
information technology, became widely accepted as a benchmark of quality 
care, then those practices might also be integrated into the legal 
malpractice standard.  For example, Hoffman and Podgurski have argued, 
“physicians who have more complete records, and better decision support 
and communication tools but who do not have the time or skill to assimilate 
the unprecedented amount of available data and to optimize their use of 
technology, may face medical malpractice claims that would never have 
emerged in the past.”47  Eventually, a plausible end result could be to make 
physicians liable for malpractice for practicing at variance with changing 
standards of clinical care (i.e., in failing to make effective use of available 
health information technology tools), or at least to make those clinical 
standards available as evidence against physicians in malpractice lawsuits.48  
Moreover, hospitals and other healthcare organizations could also have 
liability risks, to the extent that such organizations employ physicians or 
neglect to appropriately fulfill their oversight functions (see discussion in next 
section). 
In the case of CDS, physicians are using the medical software as a 
diagnostic and treatment aid, not as a substitute for their own medical 
judgment.  Thus commentators have suggested that the courts would likely 
find a physician liable for harm that resulted from the use of CDS–even if 
there were a mistake in the medical knowledge database–if the physician 
failed to question bad advice given by the CDS software and provided 
improper care to the patient that caused harm.49  Courts would assume that 
 
custom if it is found that a “‘reasonably prudent’ physician would have followed another 
treatment that might have averted” the injury/harm.  Id. 
 46. Daniel Jutras, Clinical Practice Guidelines as Legal Norms, 148 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N 
J. 905, 906-07 (1993). 
 47. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, E-Health Hazards: Provider Liability and 
Electronic Health Record Systems, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1523, 1528 (2009) [hereinafter 
Hoffman & Podgurski, E-Health Hazards]. 
 48. On the other hand, use of clinical decision support could assist physicians in 
defending against malpractice claims if compliance with clinical practice guidelines is better 
documented through the use of CDS. See Sandeep S. Mangalmurti et al., Medical 
Malpractice Liability in the Age of Electronic Health Records, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2060, 
2063 (2010). 
 49. Miller & Miller, supra note 45, at 435. We previously described a “bad” CDS as one 
that is massively over-inclusive in the warnings it provides for DDI. Here, we are describing an 
even “worse” CDS: one that simply gives flat-out erroneous advice to the physician. Clearly, 
we could imagine hypothetical computerized physician order entry (CPOE) technologies that 
might do all sorts of defective things unrelated to DDI. Although physicians and vendors both 
might face liability risk in these situations, they represent a more extreme and more unlikely set 
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trained physicians would use their own judgment and rely on their 
professional knowledge, irrespective of whether any diagnostic and 
treatment aids (such as a DDI list) were used.50  As stated by Miller and 
Miller, “this is consistent with the aims of CDS software: when functioning 
properly, it can help enhance diagnostic abilities and prevent misdiagnosis 
or other errors. However, decisions in treatment are ultimately left to the 
care provider, and the care provider should be considered responsible for 
these decisions.”51 
It seems reasonable to assume that manufacturers of CDS software 
would enjoy liability protection similar to that provided under the “learned 
intermediary” doctrine regarding prescription drug and (implantable) 
medical devices.52 The latter allows manufacturers to discharge their duty of 
care to patients by providing warnings to the prescribing physicians.53 The 
Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the policy as follows: “prescription 
drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in 
effect.  As a medical expert, the prescribing physician can take into account 
the propensities of the drug, as well as the susceptibilities of his patient.  His 
is the task of weighing the benefits of any medication against its potential 
dangers. The choice he makes is an informed one, an individualized 
medical judgment based on a knowledge of both patient and palliative.”54 
Does using CDS add additional potential liability for physicians?  On 
the one hand, physicians are already held accountable by courts for 
exercising appropriate medical judgment, as defined by what a prudent 
physician would do under the same or similar circumstances. On the other 
hand, it has been suggested that, “evidence that a doctor ignored 
automated alerts or recommendations may serve as compelling proof of 
physician wrongdoing for plaintiffs who suffer poor outcomes because of a 
doctor’s treatment decision.”55  We suspect that both points could be valid. 
 
of problems from those that we are primarily concerned with, which involve liability risk that 
specifically attaches to DDI alerting. 
 50. As explained by Rosoff: “The physician chooses what sources to turn to and what 
information to use in his or her decision-making process. It is the physician’s educated 
discretion that finds, filters and focuses these inputs for the benefit of the patient; thus, it is 
appropriately the physician’s exercise of that discretion that is the focus of the legal inquiry.” 
Rosoff, supra note 7, at 120. 
 51. Miller & Miller, supra note 45, at 435. 
 52. See also Rosoff, supra note 7, at 120 (discussing the concept of “competent human 
intervention” referenced by the Food and Drug Administration with regard to medical software 
policy). 
 53. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 6(d) (1997). 
 54. Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974). 
 55. Hoffman & Podgurski, E-Health Hazards, supra note 47, at 1546. 
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Whatever the ambiguity surrounding the liability consequences of CDS 
use, what our analysis suggests is that reliance on CDS, or in particular on a 
drug-drug interaction list, will not provide a defense to an allegation of 
negligence. However, the availability of CDS may decrease the risk of error, 
which should in turn decrease the overall risk of liability. Nevertheless, even 
a remote possibility of additional liability associated with the use of new 
kinds of health information technologies might hinder adoption by the 
provider community.  Given these sorts of legal concerns, some have 
suggested that federal policymakers should consider insulating providers 
from liability by establishing statutory protections (a so-called “safe harbor”).  
We discuss the pros and cons of establishing such a safe harbor later in this 
paper.56 
In principle, improving patient safety through use of health information 
technologies should reduce the volume of malpractice claims against 
physicians and institutions. But that principle is premised on the view that 
CDS will be effective and therefore liability reducing.  CDS with over-
inclusive warnings could be an entirely different story–especially where the 
noise-to-signal ratio is so high as to make it impossible for physicians to 
heed CDS automated warnings, but the system itself compiles compelling 
evidence that those warnings were given. 
B. Risk Born by Hospitals and Other Health Care Organizations: 
Negligence 
The implementation of HIT applications such as CDS represents a major 
undertaking for hospitals and clinics, absorbing millions of dollars and 
hundreds of thousands of person-hours because of the complexity of the 
environments into which new software applications are embedded.57  Any 
new software product has to be integrated into an existing IT infrastructure, 
which means some measure of local configuration.  Problems resulting from 
systems integration are highly likely, even in situations where the CDS 
software functions exactly as promised. 
Hospitals are not directly liable for the negligence of non-employee 
physicians, but the hospital may face lawsuits for corporate negligence.58  
Courts have found that hospitals owe four duties to their patients 
independent of the duties owed by a treating physician: (1) use of 
reasonable care in maintaining safe and adequate facilities and equipment; 
(2) to select and retain only competent physicians; (3) to oversee all persons 
who provide health care services within its walls; and (4) to formulate, adopt 
 
 56. See infra p. 285. 
 57. MEDPAC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: NEW APPROACHES IN MEDICARE, INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY IN HEALTH CARE 167, 170 (2004). 
 58. Hoffman & Podgurski, E-Health Hazards, supra note 47, at 1535. 
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and enforce adequate rules and policies to ensure quality care for the 
patients.59  For a plaintiff to prevail on a theory of corporate negligence, the 
plaintiff would have to show, in part, that the hospital had actual or 
constructive knowledge of the flaws or procedures that caused the injury.60  
Hospitals and other health care organizations would do well to select an 
EHR system designed to minimize the risk of user error, and then proactively 
develop the ability to detect clinical software problems, analyze their impact, 
address the problems in a timely way, and ensure that the overall EHR 
system (including CDS) performs as it was designed to do.61  Another way to 
actively manage risk is to ensure that clinicians receive thorough and 
adequate training in how to use the system, as well as in hospital policy 
regarding use of CDS.62  These actions together will allow hospitals to 
anticipate and prevent avoidable hazards and put them in a better position 
to manage unavoidable ones.  Commentators have also recommend that 
when deciding whether to install and how to monitor clinical software, 
hospitals and other healthcare organizations consider the clinical risks 
posed by software malfunction or misuse and the extent to which there is 
appropriate opportunity for qualified end users to recognize and easily 
override erroneous recommendations, among other considerations.63 
In addition, if the physicians, nurses, residents, interns, other health care 
workers are employees, the hospital could also be held liable for their 
negligence.64  Based on case law regarding vicarious liability, Hoffman and 
Podgurski suggest that hospitals could share liability with physicians for 
injuries caused by faulty equipment or health care providers’ inept use of 
HIT software: 
In many instances, physicians are considered independent contractors rather 
than employees, and this status shields hospitals from liability for their acts. 
Nevertheless, courts have found that a hospital’s imposition of workplace 
rules and regulations upon staff physicians is enough to undercut the 
doctors’ independent contractor status and expose the hospital to liability.  
Therefore hospitals that establish EHR use protocols and policies may be 
responsible for clinicians’ negligent operation of these systems.65 
 
 59. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703, 707 (Pa. 1991); see also Hoffman & 
Podgurski, supra note 47, E-Health Hazards, at 1535. 
 60. Hoffman & Podgurski, E-Health Hazards, supra note 47, at 1535-36. 
 61. Miller and Miller recommend a kind of “IRB” model of local review boards to serve as 
guardians to see that institutional health IT processes are carried out properly. Miller & Miller, 
supra note 45, at 441.  These local oversight boards for clinical software systems would work 
with administrators, vendors and end users.  Id. 
 62. Mangalmurti et al., supra note 48, at 2065. 
 63. Id.; see also Miller & Miller, supra note 45, at 439. 
 64. Hoffman & Podgurski, E-Health Hazards, supra note 47, at 1536. 
 65. Id. 
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C. Risks Borne by Software Vendors and Knowledge Base Providers: 
Product Liability 
A major part of the real world problem regarding CDS-related liability 
risk is that the CDS and knowledge base vendors are also worried about it.  
The vendors’ lawyers are advising them that they could be at risk if missing 
drug-drug interactions later become the focus for product liability claims. In 
response, vendors are creating CDS systems that are massively over-
inclusive in the automated drug-drug warnings they give to providers.66  
Vendors also try to protect themselves from risk via contracts with providers 
that do not allow the providers to modify the severity levels of the 
warnings.67  The drawback of this approach is that it creates CDS systems 
that are impractical to use and unhelpful to providers.68 
Under the doctrine of product liability (generally), “a plaintiff harmed by 
a seller or manufacturers’ product could recover for injuries if they were 
caused by manufacturing, design or warning defects in the product, 
regardless of the care the seller or manufacturer used in manufacturing, 
designing and marketing the product.”69 However, in their analysis of 
product liability in the context of clinical software, Miller and Miller argue 
that such liability is most appropriate in situations in which the software is an 
integral part of a medical device–a device that can be thought of as a 
“product”–and provides little opportunity for human intervention (for 
example, closed software systems such as those employed in implantable 
pacemakers).70 To this point, no court has applied product liability 
standards to computer software, and Miller and Miller argue that the use of 
CDS by physicians represents a distinguishable situation: 
In contrast, when physicians use computer software as a diagnostic aid, 
strict liability is less apposite, as the physicians are using the software to 
enhance what is ultimately their own judgment and professional 
responsibility regarding diagnosis.  Moreover, vendors of clinical software 
and its [end] users–hospitals and physicians–may face different liability 
 
 66. Greenberg & Ridgely, supra note 7, at 90. 
 67. Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Clinical Decision Support Systems Could Be Modified to 
Reduce ‘Alert Fatigue’ While Still Minimizing the Risk of Litigation, 30 HEALTH AFF. 2310, 2311 
(2011). 
 68. Id. While it could be the case that over-inclusive warning lists on CDS systems help to 
protect vendors from product liability claims, the opposite could also be true – a plaintiff might 
argue that massively over-inclusive warnings on a CDS system make those warnings useless 
for safety purposes, and hence represent a design defect in the product. In practice, it is not at 
all clear where the greater risk for vendors actually lies. 
 69. Miller & Miller, supra note 45, at 425. 
 70. Id. at 426-27. 
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standards based on their relative ability to prevent accidental injuries and 
the [social] desirability of distributing such costs.71 
As noted above, the learned intermediary doctrine endorsed by the 
courts requires that pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers 
provide “reasonable instructions or warnings regarding foreseeable risks of 
harm” to the trained professionals who prescribe their products, and then 
holds the physician liable for making individualized medical judgments for 
patients (as well as for providing effective warnings to their patients).72  
Nevertheless, vendors are correct in believing that negligence lawsuits could 
involve multiple defendants, not only physicians but also the hospital or 
clinic and possibly the software providers.  An argument for joint and several 
liability73 might go like this: the harm would not have occurred without both 
the vendor’s and the physician’s negligence.  For example, it could be 
argued that the erroneous advice provided by the CDS (which was the 
responsibility of the vendor) was harmful only because the physician failed to 
correct it. Or the argument could be that the physician may have 
recommended the erroneous course of treatment that harmed the patient 
only because the CDS software gave the physician clinically inappropriate 
advice.74 However, plaintiffs could have an uphill battle in proving 
negligence against a software vendor or knowledge base supplier.  Plaintiffs 
would have to provide evidence that the vendor failed to take sufficient 
precautions or diverged from their industry’s standard of practice, 
Absent evidence of very poor programming practices or a vendor’s failure to 
test the software, plaintiffs may find it difficult to hold vendors responsible for 
their injuries. Moreover, if an institution’s technicians have made even 
seemingly trivial modifications to the equipment or the software, vendors 
may be able to avoid or mitigate liability on the grounds that the institution 
contributed to the negligence or that it constituted an intervening cause of 
the accident that should break the chain of liability.75 
Other commentators have argued that if a healthcare organization selected 
a software system that was widely recognized as inadequate, purchased the 
system and discovered that it was defective, or failed to maintain the system 
in good working order, the organization could be found liable for resulting 
injuries.76 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODUCT LIABILITY § 6(d) (1997). 
 73. Joint and several liability requires that the concurrent acts of two or more parties 
caused the harm to the individual. BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY 840 (3d ed. 1969). 
 74. Miller & Miller, supra note 45, at 435. 
 75. Id. at 428. 
 76. Hoffman & Podgurski, E-Health Hazards, supra note 47, at 1553. 
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A hospital could sue a vendor on a contractual theory (as opposed to 
tort) for breach of implied or express warranty for the software, but as 
mentioned previously, most medical software vendors disclaim warranties in 
their contracts77 and insist on “hold harmless” (indemnification) clauses that 
protect the vendor from liability even when HIT users are strictly following 
vendor instructions.78 
D. To What Extent Are Drug-Drug Interactions the Subject of Litigation, and 
Are These Cases Making Law? 
Having examined legal theory, we sought to understand how courts 
actually treat these issues in the context of medical malpractice or product 
liability lawsuits. To understand trends over time, we searched both jury 
verdict databases (which provide information from court decisions as well as 
settlements and arbitration agreements), and case law (appellate decisions). 
 Jury Verdicts 
In order to understand the extent to which drug-drug interactions are 
currently the subject of malpractice litigation, we ran searches in two 
national jury verdict databases (JV-NAT79 and VS-JV80) available through 
Westlaw, an on-line legal research service. In JV-NAT, the search terms 
“medicine or medication or drug w/1 interaction” generated twenty-two 
“hits,” of which perhaps six to eight actually involved malpractice claims 
against physicians based on drug-drug interactions.  A similar search of VS-
JV netted four hits–none of which involved medical malpractice cases 
involving drug-drug interactions.  By contrast, when we searched the same 
database using the string “medical malpractice” we received more than 
10,000 hits. 
 
 77. Miller & Miller, supra note 45, at 428; see also Gable, supra note 24, at 141. 
 78. Ross Koppel & David Kreda, Health Information Technology Vendors’ “Hold 
Harmless” Clause: Implications for Patients and Clinicians, 301 JAMA 1276, 1276 (2009). 
 79. Jury Verdicts National (JV-NAT) database “contains verdict, judgment, settlement, 
arbitration and expert witness information compiled by” national and state jury verdict 
publishers. Scope JV-ALL, WESTLAW, http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/default.aspx?db=JV-
ALL&RP=/scope/default.wl&RS=WLW12.01&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN=_top&MT=208&MST= 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2012). Some of the records go back as far as 1982. Westlaw describes 
the database as follows: “summaries consist of information such as case type, geographical 
area where a case was tried, party names, attorneys’ names, expert witnesses’ names, factual 
information about the case, and verdict amounts. A document is a summary of a jury verdict, 
judgment, settlement or arbitration.” Id. At the time of this research, JV-NAT was still available 
through Westlaw, however it has since been combined with VS-JV into one database: JV-ALL. 
Id. 
 80. At the time of this research, VS-JV was still available through Westlaw, however it has 
since been combined with JV-NAT into one database: JV-ALL. Id. 
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We then searched all available federal and state jury verdict databases 
in Westlaw using a richer set of search terms (enumerated below). 
  Search - (“DECISION SUPPORT” “DECISION AID” “DECISION 
ANALYS*S” “CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT” “clinical decision support 
system” CDS CDSS “CLINICAL REMINDER” “AUTOMATIC REMINDER” 
“REMINDER SYSTEM”) & (((MEDICAL CLINICAL DOCTOR PHYSICIAN) /S 
(MISTAKE ERROR)) (ADVERSE /S DRUG & (EVENT REACTION)) (DRUG /S 
TOX!) (MEDICAL /P MALPRACTICE) ((LIABILITY “DUTY OF CARE”) /P 
(PHYSICIAN SURGEON DOCTOR))) JV-PI,VS-JV,JV-11TH,JV-10TH,JV-
9TH,JV-8TH,JV-7TH,JV-6TH,JV-5TH,JV-4TH (2 Docs) JV-3RD,JV-2ND,JV-
1ST (0 Docs) FL-JV-PLUS,AL-JV-PLUS,AK-JV-PLUS,DC-JV-PLUS,DE-JV-
PLUS,CT-JV-PLUS,CO-JV-PLUS,CA-JV-PLUS,AR-JV-PLUS,AZ-JV-PLUS (0 
Docs) ME-JV-PLUS,LA-JV-PLUS,KY-JV-PLUS,KS-JV-PLUS,IA-JV-PLUS,IN-JV-
PLUS,IL-JV-PLUS,ID-JV-PLUS,HI-JV-PLUS,GA-JV-PLUS (0 Docs) NH-JV-
PLUS,NV-JV-PLUS,NE-JV-PLUS,MT-JV-PLUS,MO-JV-PLUS,MS-JV-PLUS,MN-
JV-PLUS,MI-JV-PLUS,MA-JV-PLUS,MD-JV-PLUS (0 Docs) RI-JV-PLUS,PA-JV-
PLUS,OR-JV-PLUS,OK-JV-PLUS,OH-JV-PLUS,ND-JV-PLUS,NC-JV-PLUS,NY-
JV-PLUS,NM-JV-PLUS,NJ-JV-PLUS (0 Docs) WI-JV-PLUS,WV-JV-PLUS,WA-
JV-PLUS,VA-JV-PLUS,VT-JV-PLUS,UT-JV-PLUS,TX-JV-PLUS,TN-JV-PLUS,SD-
JV-PLUS,SC-JV-PLUS (0 Docs) WY-JV-PLUS (0 Docs) 
  Search - ((CLINICAL /3 GUIDELINE) “EVIDENCE BASED MEDICINE”) & 
(((MEDICAL CLINICAL DOCTOR PHYSICIAN) /S (MISTAKE ERROR)) 
(ADVERSE /S DRUG & (EVENT REACTION)) (drug /s interaction) (DRUG /S 
TOX!) (MEDICAL /P MALPRACTICE) ((LIABILITY “DUTY OF CARE”) /P 
(PHYSICIAN SURGEON DOCTOR))) JV-PI,VS-JV,JV-11TH,JV-10TH,JV-
9TH,JV-8TH,JV-7TH,JV-6TH,JV-5TH,JV-4TH (2 Docs) JV-3RD,JV-2ND,JV-
1ST (0 Docs) FL-JV-PLUS,AL-JV-PLUS,AK-JV-PLUS,DC-JV-PLUS,DE-JV-
PLUS,CT-JV-PLUS,CO-JV-PLUS,CA-JV-PLUS,AR-JV-PLUS,AZ-JV-PLUS (1 
Doc) ME-JV-PLUS,LA-JV-PLUS,KY-JV-PLUS,KS-JV-PLUS,IA-JV-PLUS,IN-JV-
PLUS,IL-JV-PLUS,ID-JV-PLUS,HI-JV-PLUS,GA-JV-PLUS (1 Doc) NH-JV-
PLUS,NV-JV-PLUS,NE-JV-PLUS,MT-JV-PLUS,MO-JV-PLUS,MS-JV-PLUS,MN-
JV-PLUS,MI-JV-PLUS,MA-JV-PLUS,MD-JV-PLUS (1 Doc) RI-JV-PLUS,PA-JV-
PLUS,OR-JV-PLUS,OK-JV-PLUS,OH-JV-PLUS,ND-JV-PLUS,NC-JV-PLUS,NY-
JV-PLUS,NM-JV-PLUS,NJ-JV-PLUS (1 Doc) WI-JV-PLUS,WV-JV-PLUS,WA-JV-
PLUS,VA-JV-PLUS,VT-JV-PLUS,UT-JV-PLUS,TX-JV-PLUS,TN-JV-PLUS,SD-JV-
PLUS,SC-JV-PLUS (1 Doc) WY-JV-PLUS (0 Docs) 
  Search - (“DRUG ALERT” ((DRUG DRUG-DRUG FOOD-DRUG HERB-
DRUG DRUG-ALLERGY) /S INTERACTION) DDI “DRUG-DOSE ALERT” 
“DRUG-DOSE SUPPORT”) & (((MEDICAL CLINICAL DOCTOR PHYSICIAN) 
/S (MISTAKE ERROR)) (ADVERSE /S DRUG & (EVENT REACTION)) (DRUG 
/S TOX!) (MEDICAL /P MALPRACTICE) ((LIABILITY “DUTY OF CARE”) /P 
(PHYSICIAN SURGEON DOCTOR))) JV-PI,VS-JV,JV-11TH,JV-10TH,JV-
9TH,JV-8TH,JV-7TH,JV-6TH,JV-5TH,JV-4TH (25 Docs) JV-3RD,JV-2ND,JV-
1ST (6 Docs) FL-JV-PLUS,AL-JV-PLUS,AK-JV-PLUS,DC-JV-PLUS,DE-JV-
PLUS,CT-JV-PLUS,CO-JV-PLUS,CA-JV-PLUS,AR-JV-PLUS,AZ-JV-PLUS (16 
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Docs) ME-JV-PLUS,LA-JV-PLUS,KY-JV-PLUS,KS-JV-PLUS,IA-JV-PLUS,IN-JV-
PLUS,IL-JV-PLUS,ID-JV-PLUS,HI-JV-PLUS,GA-JV-PLUS (23 Docs) NH-JV-
PLUS,NV-JV-PLUS,NE-JV-PLUS,MT-JV-PLUS,MO-JV-PLUS,MS-JV-PLUS,MN-
JV-PLUS,MI-JV-PLUS,MA-JV-PLUS,MD-JV-PLUS (15 Docs) RI-JV-PLUS,PA-JV-
PLUS,OR-JV-PLUS,OK-JV-PLUS,OH-JV-PLUS,ND-JV-PLUS,NC-JV-PLUS,NY-
JV-PLUS,NM-JV-PLUS,NJ-JV-PLUS (18 Docs) WI-JV-PLUS,WV-JV-PLUS,WA-
JV-PLUS,VA-JV-PLUS,VT-JV-PLUS,UT-JV-PLUS,TX-JV-PLUS,TN-JV-PLUS,SD-
JV-PLUS,SC-JV-PLUS (19 Docs) WY-JV-PLUS (1 Doc) 
  Search - ((computer! /s physician /s order) OR CPOE OR (electronic /5 
record) OR “e-health record”) & (((MEDICAL CLINICAL DOCTOR 
PHYSICIAN) /S (MISTAKE ERROR)) (ADVERSE /S DRUG & (EVENT 
REACTION)) (DRUG /S TOX!) (MEDICAL /P MALPRACTICE) ((LIABILITY 
“DUTY OF CARE”) /P (PHYSICIAN SURGEON DOCTOR))) JV-PI,VS-JV,JV-
11TH,JV-10TH,JV-9TH,JV-8TH,JV-7TH,JV-6TH,JV-5TH,JV-4TH (10 Docs) 
JV-3RD,JV-2ND,JV-1ST (0 Docs) FL-JV-PLUS,AL-JV-PLUS,AK-JV-PLUS,DC-
JV-PLUS,DE-JV-PLUS,CT-JV-PLUS,CO-JV-PLUS,CA-JV-PLUS,AR-JV-PLUS,AZ-
JV-PLUS (4 Docs) ME-JV-PLUS,LA-JV-PLUS,KY-JV-PLUS,KS-JV-PLUS,IA-JV-
PLUS,IN-JV-PLUS,IL-JV-PLUS,ID-JV-PLUS,HI-JV-PLUS,GA-JV-PLUS (6 Docs) 
NH-JV-PLUS,NV-JV-PLUS,NE-JV-PLUS,MT-JV-PLUS,MO-JV-PLUS,MS-JV-
PLUS,MN-JV-PLUS,MI-JV-PLUS,MA-JV-PLUS,MD-JV-PLUS (5 Docs) RI-JV-
PLUS,PA-JV-PLUS,OR-JV-PLUS,OK-JV-PLUS,OH-JV-PLUS,ND-JV-PLUS,NC-
JV-PLUS,NY-JV-PLUS,NM-JV-PLUS,NJ-JV-PLUS (5 Docs) WI-JV-PLUS,WV-JV-
PLUS,WA-JV-PLUS,VA-JV-PLUS,VT-JV-PLUS,UT-JV-PLUS,TX-JV-PLUS,TN-JV-
PLUS,SD-JV-PLUS,SC-JV-PLUS (5 Docs) WY-JV-PLUS (0 Docs) 
We reviewed all of the hits and found no cases that involved drug-drug 
interactions.  Only two cases uncovered in the search were somewhat 
relevant. In one, liability was based on the fact that a computerized testing 
system read a high result as an error, rather than a real result, and so did 
not report it to the physician.81  The plaintiff’s condition went undiscovered 
and the plaintiff died.82  In the other case, there was an issue created by the 
inability to amend an electronic record, although the case was decided in 
favor of the doctor.83 
Cases in which drug-drug interactions figure in the assessment of liability 
comprise a very small part of all medical malpractice litigation. We have no 
idea how comprehensive any one of these jury verdict databases is in 
absolute terms.  However, the fact that the proportion of DDI cases is so 
small across the databases (i.e., substantially less than one drug-drug 
interaction case for every 100 medical malpractice trial court cases and 
settlements) tells us that there will be even fewer at the appellate level, which 
 
 81. Johnson v. Kromhout, No. 86-19508, 1988 WL 509474 (Minn. Dist. Ct.). 
 82. Id. 
 83. Adams v. Bahalla, NC034293, 2005 WL 3729065 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 9, 2005). 
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is where decisions establish legal precedent that affects the determination of 
future cases. 
 Appellate Decisions 
To determine whether cases related to drug-drug interactions have 
made law (i.e., whether courts spoke to these specific issues within the 
context of malpractice or product liability law in appellate decisions), we 
searched the Westlaw ALLCASES database84  using the following search 
terms: 
  Search - (“DECISION SUPPORT” “DECISION AID” “DECISION 
ANALYS*S” “CLINICAL DECISION SUPPORT” “clinical decision support 
system” CDS CDSS “CLINICAL REMINDER” “AUTOMATIC REMINDER” 
“REMINDER SYSTEM”) & (((MEDICAL CLINICAL DOCTOR PHYSICIAN) /S 
(MISTAKE ERROR)) (ADVERSE /S DRUG & (EVENT REACTION)) (DRUG /S 
TOX!) (MEDICAL /P MALPRACTICE) ((LIABILITY “DUTY OF CARE”) /P 
(PHYSICIAN SURGEON DOCTOR))) & SY,DI(“313AK223” “198HV”) (30 
Docs) 
  Search - ((CLINICAL /3 GUIDELINE) “EVIDENCE BASED MEDICINE”) & 
(((MEDICAL CLINICAL DOCTOR PHYSICIAN) /S (MISTAKE ERROR)) 
(ADVERSE /S DRUG & (EVENT REACTION)) (drug /s interaction) (DRUG /S 
TOX!) (MEDICAL /P MALPRACTICE) ((LIABILITY “DUTY OF CARE”) /P 
(PHYSICIAN SURGEON DOCTOR))) (110 Docs) 
  Search - (“DRUG ALERT” ((DRUG DRUG-DRUG FOOD-DRUG HERB-
DRUG DRUG-ALLERGY) /S INTERACTION) DDI “DRUG-DOSE ALERT” 
“DRUG-DOSE SUPPORT”) & (((MEDICAL CLINICAL DOCTOR PHYSICIAN) 
/S (MISTAKE ERROR)) (ADVERSE /S DRUG & (EVENT REACTION)) (DRUG 
/S TOX!) (MEDICAL /P MALPRACTICE) ((LIABILITY “DUTY OF CARE”) /P 
(PHYSICIAN SURGEON DOCTOR))) & SY,DI(“198HV”) (51 Docs) 
  Search - (“DRUG ALERT” ((DRUG DRUG-DRUG FOOD-DRUG HERB-
DRUG DRUG-ALLERGY) /S INTERACTION) DDI “DRUG-DOSE ALERT” 
“DRUG-DOSE SUPPORT”) & (((MEDICAL CLINICAL DOCTOR PHYSICIAN) 
/S (MISTAKE ERROR)) (ADVERSE /S DRUG & (EVENT REACTION)) (DRUG 
/S TOX!) (MEDICAL /P MALPRACTICE) ((LIABILITY “DUTY OF CARE”) /P 
(PHYSICIAN SURGEON DOCTOR))) & SY,DI(“313Ak223”) (77 Docs) 
 
 84. The Westlaw ALLCASES “database contains documents from the U.S. Supreme Court, 
courts of appeals, former circuit courts, district courts, bankruptcy courts, former Court of 
Claims, Court of Federal Claims, Tax Court, related federal and territorial courts, military 
courts, the state courts of all 50 states and the local courts of the District of Columbia,” with 
coverage beginning in 1658.  Scope ALLCASES, WESTLAW, http://web2.westlaw.com/scope/ 
default.aspx?db=ALLCASES&RP=/scope/default.wl&RS=WLW12.01&VR=2.0&SV=Split&FN
=_top&MT=208&MST= (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). Westlaw notes that “[a] document is a 
decision or order decided by one of these courts.”  Id. 
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  Search - ((computer! /s physician /s order) OR CPOE OR (electronic /5 
record) OR “e-health record”) & (((MEDICAL CLINICAL DOCTOR 
PHYSICIAN) /S (MISTAKE ERROR)) (ADVERSE /S DRUG & (EVENT 
REACTION)) (DRUG /S TOX!) (MEDICAL /P MALPRACTICE) ((LIABILITY 
“DUTY OF CARE”) /P (PHYSICIAN SURGEON DOCTOR))) & 
SY,DI(“313AK223” OR “198HV”) (23 Docs) 
These search terms identified only a single case where the court 
mentions in the statement of facts that the nurses and nurse practitioners 
involved in the patient’s care knew of the existence of Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention (“CDC”) clinical guidelines related to the diagnosis 
and treatment of the condition at issue (lactic acidosis), that the guidelines 
warned of a potentially fatal side effect of the antiretroviral treatment, and 
that the guidelines were available in binders in all nursing stations in the 
federally-funded clinic at which they practiced.85  The court found the clinic 
and its employees liable for failure to diagnose and treat lactic acidosis in a 
timely manner and awarded damages.86  In testimony, the nurses stated that 
they did not know if they had referred to the clinical guidelines, but the court 
does not discuss how that affected the court’s decision on liability, if at all.87 
We also searched for citations within relevant scholarly articles in Lexis-
Nexis Academic Universe and Social Science Research Network (“SSRN”) 
databases, using the search terms “decision support,” “clinical guidelines” 
and “drug (or drug-drug) interaction” along with “medical malpractice” 
and/or “liability.”  We discarded many articles because they dealt with legal 
obligations for pharmacies and pharmacists (topics outside of the scope of 
this article) and concentrated on articles focused on e-health and the law – 
including those that considered liability aspects of electronic medical 
records, computerized physician order entry and clinical decision support.  
We reviewed approximately twenty-five articles and culled from them the 
very few cases that were cited in support of various legal theories. 
We found only six pertinent cases cited in this literature, two of which 
broadly concerned physician liability for adverse drug events that might have 
been prevented had available warning information been accessed.88  In 
these cases, a physician was found to have failed to meet the standard of 
care by not considering warnings in the Physician Desk Reference 
(suggesting that it is even more likely that a physician would be found liable 
in similar circumstances if the warning had appeared on a computer screen 
 
 85. Kasongo v. United States, 523 F. Supp. 2d 759, 778, 780 (N.D. Ill. 2007). 
 86. Id. at 793, 812. 
 87. Id. at 780. 
 88. Jones v. Bick, 2004-0758, pp. 1, 13 (La. App. 4 Cir. 12/15/04); 891 So. 2d 737, 
739, 744; Fournet v. Roule-Graham, 00-1653, pp. 1, 5-6 (La.App. 5 Cir. 3/14/01); 783 So. 
2d 439, 440, 443. 
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in the course of prescribing).89 The other two cases were not on point but 
were used by commentators to suggest that courts might also find hospitals 
negligent for furnishing defective software, for inadequate testing and 
maintenance of equipment, or for inadequate training for clinicians who 
were using CDS under hospital policy decisions.90 
Although these cases are not setting legal precedent on drug-drug 
interactions, it does not mean that cases involving adverse drug events are 
not affecting the practice of medicine.  For example, there was a case in the 
mid-1980s, well known in medical circles as the “Libby Zion” case, in which 
there was an allegation of medical malpractice related to a drug-drug 
interaction that resulted in a death.91 The doctors were found negligent 
(while the hospital was exonerated) and the plaintiffs were awarded 
damages for wrongful death and pain and suffering.92 The decision of the 
trial court was not appealed (and therefore “Libby Zion” did not make law in 
the judicial sense) but the controversy stimulated by this case did lead to 
legislation in New York that in turn significantly influenced the training rules 
for interns and residents in hospitals across the nation, resulting in a limit on 
hours worked per week, a higher resident-to-patient ratio, and closer 
supervision of trainees, especially in busy and often chaotic emergency 
rooms.93 Even without legislation, cases such as Zion v. New York Hospital 
can have a dramatic influence on practice as a cautionary tale. 
It is worth remembering that despite the interest in the legal literature 
and predictions about how HIT might affect liability over time, medical 
malpractice decisions that turn specifically on DDI are rare, and DDI itself 
has not been an issue that finders of fact (judges and juries) have focused 
 
 89. Jones, 2004-0758 at p. 16; 891 So. 2d at 746; Fournet, 00-1653 at pp. 5-6; 783 
So. 2d at 443. 
 90. Lamb v. Candler Gen. Hosp., Inc., 413 S.E.2d 720, 721-22 (Ga. 1992) (holding the 
hospital liable in ordinary negligence for furnishing defective equipment); Berg v. United 
States, 806 F.2d 978, 983 (10th Cir. 1986) (upholding the verdict for plaintiff whose injuries 
were caused in part by lack of adequate testing and maintenance of equipment and lack of 
adequate training of technicians). 
 91. David A. Asch & Ruth M. Parker, The Libby Zion Case: One Step Forward or Two 
Steps Backward?, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED. 771, 771, 773 (1988). Unfortunately, there are no 
published trial court opinions on this case. There were appeals during pre-trial proceedings 
that did produce written opinions, but those opinions had nothing to do with DDI, and were 
only peripherally relevant to the subsequent trial court case. The disputes that went up to the 
appeals court had to do with the admissibility of evidence concerning a hospital’s own quality 
improvement activities. Zion v. N.Y. Hosp., 183 A.D.2d 386, 389 (1992). 
 92. Jennifer F. Whetsell, Changing the Law, Changing the Culture: Rethinking the “Sleepy 
Resident” Problem, 12 ANNALS HEALTH L. 23, 35 (2003); Craig Horowitz, The Doctor Is Out, 
NEW YORK, Nov. 2003, at 35, 38. 
 93. Asch & Parker, supra note 91, at 773. 
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on when deciding whether medical negligence has occurred in particular 
cases. 
III.  FIVE STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS LIABILITY CONCERNS 
Prior case law related to medical malpractice outlines the liability that 
health care providers face when harm results from a lack of care exercised 
in diagnosing and treating patients. Research evidence suggests that CDS 
may reduce medical error by automating much of the function of prescribing 
and therefore has the potential to reduce error and liability risk.94  However, 
real world practice, backed by empirical evidence, also suggests that CDS 
programs that overwhelm physicians with clinically insignificant alerts cause 
physicians to “tune out” and miss or override potentially important alerts.95  
Tuning out in this manner is inherently liability enhancing, and the CDS 
program provides a clear evidence trail. 
The solution proposed by the ONC and the members of the Advancing 
Clinical Decision Support project team is development and endorsement of 
a clinically significant DDI list that vendors can embed in their CDS 
systems.96  Access to this product would be provided free of charge.  The 
hurdle is to get vendors and healthcare organizations to adopt the clinically 
significant DDI list in lieu of the overly inclusive DDI lists developed by 
commercial knowledge base vendors or those homegrown at various 
institutions. 
In consultation with the Advancing Clinical Decision Support team, we 
focused on five possible strategies to address CDS-related liability concerns. 
Again, the ultimate policy aim is to encourage better CDS technology and 
stronger adoption of the technology by health care providers.  One avenue 
for doing that is directly through legal reform.  Another is to promote CDS 
systems that draw on a consensus based DDI list. The latter involves 
addressing vendor liability concerns as a precursor to improving the 
technology, and decreasing provider liability risk as a result.  Some 
strategies focus primarily on provider liability, while others focus more on 
vendor liability.  They represent a range of possible interventions to untie the 
liability knot that has so far inhibited adoption of CDS systems. 
 
 94. Kesselheim et al., supra note 67, at 2310, 2310 (2011). 
 95. Id. at 2311. 
 96. RAND HEALTH, supra note 8. 
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Strategy #1: Initiate a national “expert” process to endorse a clinically 
significant DDI list that is likely to carry weight in tort actions in state courts 
(i.e., likely to be admitted into evidence regarding the standard of care). 
In their 2009 study of the implementation of computerized physician 
order entry (“CPOE”) in seven Western countries, Aarts and Koppel selected 
the Dutch, and to a lesser extent Australian, systems for comment because in 
those systems,  “pharmacy departments have been major drivers of CPOE 
because of their roles as being legally co-responsible for patient care.”97 
They point to the importance of the Dutch national drug interaction alert 
database, which underlies all of that country’s CPOE decision-support 
systems.98  This is in stark contrast to the situation in the United States and 
has implications for pushing forward the adoption of CPOE and CDS. As 
they view it: 
The United States is the only country in this study where industry groups 
effectively lobby for health IT.  Although this may spur health IT spending, it 
also encourages many differing and proprietary systems, few of which 
communicate with each other. Such fragmentation retards CPOE 
implementation. In the United States, there are more than 200 EMR 
vendors. Few other countries face similar challenges. Also, U.S. state or 
regional authorities often encourage health IT and CPOE use - especially 
since control of health care is not nationally centralized. This localized 
approach may lead to uneven development and contrasting platforms, 
which can be counterproductive for broader implementation of CPOE and 
health IT.99 
Based on their observations, Aarts and Koppel suggest: 
National strategies would also help reduce the “noise” and wasted effort of 
competing vendors and lack of interoperability, both within institutions and 
across them—perhaps also increasing funding for more institutions via 
economies of scope and scale . . . Our data also suggest that having a 
national standard for prescribing medications and identifying harmful 
interactions might help CPOE adoption.100 
Their recommendation is to develop and implement national standards for 
decision-support reminders and alerts, they believe should come from 
professional associations.101 Using professional associations rather than the 
 
 97. Jos Aarts & Ross Koppel, Implementation of Computerized Physician Order Entry in 
Seven Countries, 28 HEALTH AFF. 404, 412 (2009). 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id., supra note 97, at 412. 
 101. Id. at 412-13. In a commentary, Miller and colleagues also argue the need for a 
national standard for drug interaction information. See Randolph A. Miller et al., Clinical 
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government to develop and endorse a DDI list would achieve two goals: it 
would create a single standard for drug-drug interaction alerts, and at the 
same time, it would engage relevant expertise in the development of an 
“open source” standard that vendors can embed in proprietary products, if 
desired. 
Among those professional groups that should be involved in such a 
consensus-oriented process are the American Medical Association (“AMA”), 
the American College of Physicians (“ACP”), the American Academy of 
Pediatrics (“AAP”), the American Academy of Family Physicians (“AAFP”), the 
American Society of Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics (“ASCPT”), the 
American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (“ASHP”) and the American 
Medical Informatics Association (“AMIA”).  There are also specialty medical 
societies that may wish to be involved. 
If the DDI list is good, and useful vendor and homegrown systems are 
built around it, then almost by definition, the technology should be liability–
reducing and therefore attractive for physicians.  Widespread adoption of 
the CDS technology with an open source DDI list that has been vetted and 
endorsed by a wide range of professional associations would likely shift the 
standard of care and would perhaps pull the DDI list into the definition of 
the legal standard of care.  Given that the law in most states now recognizes 
a national (as opposed to local) standard of care,102 having a group of 
appropriate national professional societies involved in ratifying a national 
DDI list should have the effect of “moving the goal posts” even faster. 
Malpractice liability will continue to be judged based on negligence, and by 
comparison with professional standards of care, so moving the goal posts in 
terms of the standard of care seems like a reasonable strategy to employ. 
Key to this effort is reaching consensus on a clinically significant DDI list.  
The experience of the Advancing Clinical Decision Support project has been 
that reaching consensus is not easily achieved.  It is an open question 
whether a group of private organizations would be willing to take on such 
an effort without a partnership with the government (or at a minimum some 
source of ongoing funding) since it would require not only endorsing a 
clinically significant DDI list but also establishing a system for updating the 
list over time. 
 
Decision Support and Electronic Prescribing Systems: A Time for Responsible Thought and 
Action, 12 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 403, 406-07 (2005). 
 102. Michelle Huckaby Lewis et al., The Locality Rule and the Physician’s Dilemma, 297 
JAMA 2633, 2634 (2007). 
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Strategy #2: The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) could reverse its 
current policy and regulate medical software as a Class III medical device, 
thus possibly pre-empting tort actions at the state level. 
A second avenue that might be considered is immunity from tort for 
medical device manufacturers, in connection with FDA-approved products.  
In 2008, the Supreme Court addressed this issue in Riegel v. Medtronic, 
concluding that state tort claims are expressly pre-empted by FDA authority 
and product review in connection with Class III medical devices (i.e., those 
which have gone through the full FDA review and pre-market approval 
process).103 
This ruling has several implications for our work.  If subjected to a Class 
III FDA approval process, CDS software would become insulated from 
product liability tort claims.  This outcome would likely eliminate the 
perverse incentives for building “bad” CDS systems (i.e., those with overly 
inclusive DDI lists) and for ignoring a federal DDI list in designing those 
systems.  A robust DDI list is potentially a linchpin for implementing effective 
CDS systems, for facilitating FDA safety oversight, and for reducing vendor 
and physician liability risk, all at the same time. 
Does the FDA have the legal authority to regulate CDS software 
programs as medical devices?  The answer depends on whom you ask.  
Briefly, Congress framed a broad scheme for regulating food, drugs and 
medical devices under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act of 1938 
(“FDCA”).104 In part, the original intent of the statute was to protect the 
public from fraud, in connection with a variety of product categories.105  
Congress brought medical devices under more stringent regulatory control 
with the 1976 Medical Device Amendments (“MDA”) to the FDCA.  Under 
the amendments, a medical device is defined as: 
an instrument, apparatus, implement, machine, contrivance, implant, in 
vitro reagent, or other similar or related article, including any component, 
part or accessory which is . . . . 
 
 103. 552 U.S. 312, 312 (2008). 
 104. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic (FDCA) Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2006 & Supp. 
2010).  The original section numbers of the FDCA do not appear in the United States Code, 
therefore parallel citations are given to the FDCA sections and the code sections.  The FDA 
provides FDCA section numbers corresponding to the code provisions on its website.  Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FD&C Act), U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ 
RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/FederalFoodDrugandCosmeticActFDCAct/default.htm (last 
visited Feb. 24, 2012). 
 105. Vincent Brannigan, The Regulation of Medical Expert Computer Software as a 
“Device” Under the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 27 JURIMETRICS J. 370, 371 (1987). 
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(2) intended for use in the diagnosis of disease or other conditions, or in the 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, in man or other 
animals.106 
The amended FDCA also categorizes devices to indicate rising levels of 
regulatory burden.107 Class I devices (for example, crutches) do not require 
pre-market approval and are subject only to manufacturing controls.108 
Class II devices (the bulk of medical devices) are cleared using the “Section 
510(k)” process for “substantially equivalent devices.” 109 Section 510(k) 
requires more stringent performance testing but does not require pre-market 
approval.110  Class III devices are subject to the most stringent requirements 
–analogous to a New Drug Application (“NDA”)–including full pre-market 
approval for higher risk products based on appropriate testing that proves 
the device performs its stated functions safely and effectively.111  Class III 
devices include cardiac pacemakers and heart valves.112  Needless to say, if 
the FDA determined that medical software was a Class III device, regulatory 
compliance costs for software vendors would be substantial. 
In a recent analysis, Hoffman and Podgurski argue that FDA authority to 
regulate electronic health records systems is “much more dubious.”113 They 
point out that electronic medical records (and by corollary CDS systems), 
unlike the computer software that is an integral part of a medical apparatus 
that is implanted in a human (such as a pacemaker) or that delivers patient 
care (such as a respirator), “have no impact without human input and 
human intervention.”114 Therefore, from their point of view, electronic health 
records would be excluded from FDA regulation.115 
Whatever the ambiguity about FDA authority to regulate electronic 
health record systems, the FDA has chosen not to do so, and courts have 
 
 106. FDCA § 201(h), 21 U.S.C. § 321(h) (2006). 
 107. FDCA § 513, 21 U.S.C. § 360c. 
 108. FDCA § 510(l), 21 U.S.C. § 360(l). 
 109. See FDCA § 510(o), 21 U.S.C. § 360(o).  Section 510(k) of the Federal Food, Drug 
and Cosmetic Act requires device manufacturers who must register, to notify the FDA of their 
intent to market a medical device at least 90 days in advance. FDCA § 510(n), 21 U.S.C. § 
360(n). This is known as Pre-market Notification (PMN). This notification allows the FDA to 
determine whether the device is equivalent to a device already placed into one of the three 
classification categories.  FDCA § 510(k), 21 U.S.C. § 360(k). 
 110. FDCA § 513, 21 U.S.C. § 360c. 
 111. Brannigan, supra note 107, at 372. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, Finding a Cure: The Case for Regulation and 
Oversight of Electronic Health Record Systems, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 103, 134 
(2008) [hereinafter Hoffman & Podgurski, Finding a Cure]. 
 114. Id. at 135. 
 115. Id. 
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traditionally given deference to FDA decisions about its own jurisdiction.116 
In the agency’s 1989 guidance on such regulation (although it was never 
formally adopted), the agency stated that: 
the FDA [has] declined to extend its regulatory authority to software that is 
‘intended for use only in traditional library functions, such as storage, 
retrieval, and dissemination of medical information’–functions traditionally 
carried out through textbooks or journals . . . Of particular significance is 
the draft policy’s exemption of computer products, such as decision support 
systems, that involve ‘competent human intervention before any impact on 
human health occurs.’117 
Stated another way, computerized software that generates advice but 
operates in a manner that allows clinician-users to easily override the advice 
should be exempt from FDA regulation.118  As summarized by the FDA in the 
Federal Register in 1996: 
in the 1989 draft . . . medical software devices (unclassified medical 
software devices that are not components, parts, or accessories to classified 
devices) would not be subject to active regulatory oversight if they ‘are 
intended to involve competent human intervention before any impact on 
human health occurs (e.g., where clinical judgment and experience can be 
used to check and interpret a system’s output).’119 
However, at a public workshop in July 1996, the FDA suggested that they 
might revisit the issue of regulating software programs as medical 
devices.120 The FDA observed that: 
the increasing complexity and sophistication of current software devices 
makes it increasingly difficult to decide when healthcare  practitioners can, 
in fact, comprehend the functions performed by the  software sufficiently to 
know when significant errors have occurred.121 
 
 116. Id. at 371. 
 117. Hoffman & Podgurski, Finding a Cure, supra note 113, at 134-35; see U.S. FOOD & 
DRUG ADMIN., FDA POLICY FOR THE REGULATION OF COMPUTER PRODUCTS (DRAFT) (1989). 
 118. Miller & Miller, supra note 45, at 439. 
 119. Medical Devices; Medical Software Devices; Notice of Public Workshop, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 36,886, 36,886 (July 15, 1996). 
 120. Id. at 36,887. “The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and the National Library of 
Medicine (NLM) are announcing a public workshop to discuss definitions of medical software 
devices, criteria for defining risk categories, software quality audits and pre-market 
notification, commercial distribution of software, and the options available for regulating 
medical software devices. FDA has noted some confusion among manufacturers regarding 
which requirements apply to medical software devices and accessories. This workshop will 
help to clarify the requirements, and provide FDA with information to better assess the risks to 
public health associated with different types of medical software devices.”  Id. at 36,886. 
 121. Id. at 36,887. 
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During the workshop, the FDA discussed the difficulty of determining with 
precision what “competent human intervention” means in the face of 
increasingly complex computer programs whose underlying algorithms may 
not have accounted for conditions (such as co-morbidities) that are 
important to a particular patient.122  Physician end-users may not be in a 
position to “adequately protect against potentially harmful software defects, 
since most clinicians will not be able to determine whether these 
sophisticated tools have formulated the correct approach in a particular 
instance.”123 
In response to the FDA’s concerns, a consortium of industry groups 
published recommendations “for public and private actions that were 
intended to accomplish responsible monitoring and regulation of clinical 
software programs,” and urged end-users, vendors, and regulatory agencies 
to adopt them.124 The consortium supported FDA regulation only for 
categories of software deemed to be of high clinical risk with “the lack of 
opportunity for qualified users, such as licensed practitioners, to recognize 
and easily override clinically inappropriate recommendations.”125 
The FDA has not initiated regulatory action in this area, but the FDA’s 
Center for Devices and Radiological Health did create a Working Group in 
2009 to examine whether regulation of electronic health records is required 
to prevent patient harm and risk to privacy.126  According to one analysis, 
the role of systems such as CDS may prove to be key in the FDA’s 
determination: 
The more the FDA finds that such systems function largely as electronic 
equivalents of traditional paper recordkeeping systems, the less likely it is 
that FDA will seek to regulate them actively.  By contrast, to the extent that 
FDA finds such systems have clinically directive functions that health care 
providers may come to rely upon in treating patients the more likely it is that 
FDA will scrutinize EHRs closely and consider actively regulating them.  One 
option the FDA will likely consider is whether to establish a tiered system of 
regulation based on the degree of sophistication of a particular EHR system, 
 
 122. Hoffman & Podgurski, Finding a Cure, supra note 113, at 135. 
 123. Id. 
 124. These recommendations are described in detail in Miller & Miller, supra note 45, at 
439-442. 
 125. Id. at 439. 
 126. FDA Creates Working Group on Regulation of Electronic Health Record Systems, 
ROPES & GRAY, 1 (Apr. 2, 2009), http://www.ropesgray.com/files/Publication/23e027f0-d874 
-44db-9b1c-026fe32099c8/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/7619c9c8-7d24-4b50-b6d 
3-4cee91f3cb7e/RopesGray_Alert_FDARegulationOfElectronicHealthRecordsSystems.pdf 
[hereinafter ROPES & GRAY]. 
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similar to the classification scheme the agency created in the late 1990s for 
software systems that store, transmit, or manipulate radiological images.127 
More recently, Jeffrey Shuren, Director of the Center for Devices and 
Radiological Health, testified before the Health Information Technology 
Policy Committee’s Adoption/Certification Workgroup on February 25, 
2010.128  During that testimony, he asserted the FDA’s authority over HIT 
software, described “serious safety concerns that have come to light” and 
discussed a “range of approaches” that the FDA might take to “play an 
important role in preventing and addressing HIT-related safety issues, 
thereby helping to foster confidence in these devices.”129  Among these 
approaches was the application of FDA’s “traditional regulatory 
framework,” including Class III pre-market approval for “high and medium 
risk HIT devices before they go into market use.”130 
The most obvious objection to FDA regulation is that many vendors do 
not want their CDS systems to be reviewed by FDA at all, because obtaining 
FDA approval would be burdensome both in time and money. In fact, some 
industry members have argued that EHR systems do not meet the definition 
of a medical device and are therefore outside of FDA’s statutory 
jurisdiction.131  Some legal commentators have also argued against FDA 
regulation, based on a concern that the traditional FDA framework is 
inadequate as applied to this sort of technology.132 
We suggest two responses to the vendors’ perspective. First, if FDA 
review and approval were available to CDS vendors, it would potentially be 
 
 127. Id. (emphasis added). 
 128. Health Information Technology (HIT) Policy Committee Adoption/Certification 
Workgroup (testimony by Jeffrey Shuren, Dir. of FDA Ctr. for Devices and Radiological Health) 
(Feb. 25, 2010), available at http://healthit.hhs.gov/portal/server.pt/gateway/PTARGS_0_ 
10741_910717_0_0_18/3Shuren_Testimony022510.pdf. 
 129. Id. at 2. 
 130. Id. at 3. 
 131. ROPES & GRAY, supra note 126, at 2. Not all EHR vendors are opposed to FDA 
regulation. According to a story in the Huffington Post, Cerner Corporation has voluntarily 
reported safety problems to the FDA and believes that all vendors should be required to do 
the same. Fred Shulte & Emma Schwartz, FDA Considers Regulating Safety of Electronic Health 
Systems, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 25, 2010, 6:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/ 
02/23/fda-considers-regulating_n_474137.html (last updated May 25, 2011, 4:35 PM). 
 132. See, e.g., Hoffman & Podgurski, Finding a Cure, supra note 113, at 139.  They 
argue, instead, that Congress should give jurisdiction to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (because CMS already has enforcement authority for the HIPAAA Security 
Rule) or create a new regulatory agency.  Id.  Note, however, that their paper was published 
prior to the adoption by Congress of the HITECH Act, which placed some regulatory authority 
for HIT in the hands of two agencies of the Department of Health and Human Services – CMS 
and the ONC.  See, e.g., HITECH Act § 13301, 123 Stat. at 246 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 300jj-31). 
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a complete bar to product liability tort risk in state courts, at least if these 
systems were deemed to require Class III pre-market approval.  That would 
be a significant benefit to the vendors.  As a strategy for mitigating liability 
risk, it seems better than the arguably foolish alternative of building CDS 
systems that are massively over-inclusive in the warnings that they give.  In 
theory vendors can be sued if they take the latter course–and arguably they 
are creating new forms of tort risk for themselves when they do so.  An FDA 
or inter-agency review approach might be presented to the vendors in a far 
more palatable way, simply by framing the positive liability implications 
more clearly. 
Second, it may not matter whether or not vendors like the idea of FDA 
review. If the FDA decides that EHR and CDS systems are within their 
jurisdiction, and if it continues to receive reports of death and injuries 
through its voluntary notification system, the agency may decide to regulate 
the systems regardless of vendor arguments against doing so.  Should the 
question of FDA jurisdiction be contested, Congress could explicitly provide 
jurisdiction.  FDA or other federal agency review (see below) could serve as 
a stick, as well as a carrot, in driving the adoption of a clinically significant 
DDI list, assuming that federal policymakers want to compel vendors to 
move in that direction. 
Strategy #3: ONC could work with the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (“CMS”) to revisit the issue of endorsing a clinically significant DDI 
list in the HITECH meaningful use regulations. 
The HITECH Act, signed into law on February 17, 2009 as a part of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (“ARRA”), amended the Public 
Health Service Act to codify the Office of the National Coordinator for 
Health Information Technology, required the national coordinator to 
establish a governance mechanism for a nationwide health information 
network, and required the national coordinator to establish a voluntary 
program to certify HIT.133  Through HITECH, Congress also amended the 
Social Security Act to provide incentive payments to hospitals and physicians 
to promote adoption and use of certified HIT.134  It has been argued that 
through HITECH Congress sought a financial incentive that would prove to 
be a catalyst with the potential to transform the healthcare system.135 
 
 133. HITECH Act § 13101, 123 Stat. at 228, 230-32 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-
11). 
 134. HITECH Act § 4101(a), 123 Stat. at 467 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4); HITECH 
Act § 4102(a), 123 Stat. at 477 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww). 
 135. Marilyn Lamar & Daniel Orenstein, Medicare and Medicaid Incentives for Healthcare 
Providers to Adopt Electronic Health Records, in HITECH ACT RESOURCE GUIDE, AHLA MEMBER 
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 Title IV of ARRA provides significant financial incentives through the 
Medicare and Medicaid programs to encourage hospitals and doctors to 
adopt and use certified EHR.136 It also reduces payments for those who are 
not meaningful EHR users, beginning in 2015.137 As specified in the 
HITECH Act, meaningful users must meet each of three requirements: 
1. Demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Secretary [of HHS] that they are 
using certified EHR technology in a meaningful manner; 
2. Demonstrate that the certified technology is connected in a manner that 
provides for electronic exchange of information to improve the quality of 
health care, including care coordination; and 
3. Use the certified EHR to submit information on clinical quality and other 
measures specified by the Secretary.138 
Congress gave the Secretary of HHS wide latitude with regard to regulating 
meaningful use.139  The definition of meaningful use was not meant to be 
static.  Congress specifically authorized HHS to require more stringent 
measures of meaningful use over time.140 In fact, the statute includes a 
provision that actions may not be brought in court to challenge the 
Secretary’s determination of what constitutes a meaningful EHR user or the 
methodology and standards of determining the incentive payment 
amounts.141 
On July 28, 2010, CMS published the final rules that govern the 
meaningful use incentive program within Medicare and Medicaid for Stage 
1 (implementation beginning in 2011).142  The rules were effective on 
September 27, 2010.143  Among the Stage 1 objectives and measures were 
two that are relevant to this discussion.  The Stage 1 final rules required 
CPOE for medication orders (30%) and also required drug-drug interaction 
and drug-allergy interaction checks as core measures.144 
 
BRIEFING: AN ANALYSIS OF THE HITECH ACT 56, available at http://www.healthlawyers.org/ 
Members/PracticeGroups/HIT/memberbriefings/Documents/HITECHActResourceGuide.pdf. 
 136. HITECH Act § 4101(a), 123 Stat. at 467 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4). 
 137. HITECH Act § 4101(b), 123 Stat. at 472 (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4). 
 138. Lamar & Orenstein, supra note 135, at 57. 
 139. HITECH Act § 4101(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-4(o)(2)(4)(iii)). 
 140. HITECH Act § 4101(a), 123 Stat. at 468-470 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-
4(o)(2)). 
 141. HITECH Act § 4101(a), 123 Stat. at 471 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-
4(o)(3)(C)). 
 142. Medicare and Medicaid Programs; Electronic Health Record Incentive Program, 75 
Fed. Reg. 44,314, 44,326 (July 28, 2010) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 412, 413, 422, 
and 495). 
 143. Id. at 44,314. 
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The text of the final rules specifically addressed comments that the 
agency had received questioning the inclusion of drug-drug interaction 
alerts and drug-allergy alerts as core measures: 
Comments: Several commenters expressed concern of “alert fatigue” 
occurring with drug-drug interaction checks. Alert fatigue or otherwise 
known as “pop-up” fatigue is a commonly perceived occurrence with 
electronic medical records and clinical decision support tools in which alerts 
are presented to the user when a potential safety issue is identified by the 
system (for example, drug to drug interaction).  The alerts, while beneficial 
in some cases, can result in a type of “fatigue” whereby the provider, after 
receiving too many alerts, begins to ignore and/or override the alerts. 
Receiving too many alerts can result in slowing the provider down rendering 
the alert useless. Commenters recommended some changes to the objective 
and associated measure to mitigate the risk of “alert fatigue” such as 
limiting the checks for interactions to only the most critical medications or 
allowing for adjustment of risk levels rather than an on/off functionality. 
Response: We recognize “alert fatigue” is a potential occurrence with drug-
drug and drug-allergy checks. However, meaningful use seeks to utilize the 
capabilities of certified EHR technology and any means to address alert 
fatigue requires a critical evaluation of each alert.  We believe this is beyond 
the scope of the definition of meaningful use.  We believe these checks are 
valuable and improve patient care and therefore do not remove them to 
address alert fatigue.145 
The relevant question for this discussion is whether ONC could work with 
CMS to resurrect the issue of whether promoting a clinically significant DDI 
list is outside the scope of the meaningful use regulations. Work is underway 
on development of the proposal for Stage 2 meaningful use regulations.146 
For example, the Health Information Technology Policy Committee, the 
federal committee that advises HHS on HIT matters has recently released a 
Request for Comment on Meaningful Use Stage 2.147 The Committee has 
proposed for the Stage 2 rules that providers “employ drug-drug interaction 
checking and drug allergy checking “on appropriate evidence-based 
interactions.”148 
Whether or not CMS endorses the use of a clinically significant DDI list 
in the next set of meaningful use regulations, some might interpret the Stage 
1 requirements to have effectively given the federal government’s imprimatur 
 
 145. Id. at 44,335. 
 146. See, e.g., HIT POL’Y COMM., MEANINGFUL USE WORKGROUP REQUEST FOR COMMENTS 
REGARDING MEANINGFUL USE STAGE 2, at 1, 2, 4 (2011), available at http://healthit.hhs.gov/ 
media/faca/MU_RFC%20_2011-01-12_final.pdf (describing what the committee has done 
thus far and what areas they seek public input). 
 147. Id. at 1. 
 148. Id. at 5. 
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on the use of CDS–such that a physician defendant in a malpractice action 
could argue that the use of CDS with a DDI list was required by federal law.  
In that way, it could be argued that the federal government, through the 
meaningful use regulations, is creating a new standard of care at least with 
regard to the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
Strategy #4: ONC could certify the clinically significant DDI list as the 
standard for drug-drug interaction lists within certified EHR. 
The HITECH Act established a voluntary certification process for HIT 
products and directed the National Coordinator to support the development 
and routine updating of qualified EHR technology, and to make it available, 
unless the Secretary determines that provider needs and demands are being 
met by the marketplace.149  This latter provision was designed to allow the 
federal government to develop EHR technology to address needs that were 
not being “substantially and adequately met through the marketplace.”150 
Section 3004 of the HITECH Act specified the process for adopting a set 
of standards, implementation specifications, and certification criteria.151  The 
program is voluntary–the HITECH Act does not mandate a set of national 
standards but it does effectively impose the standards developed on any 
person or entity that participates in federal healthcare programs (which is 
the vast majority of health care providers).152 
On July 28, 2010, the same day that CMS published the final rules on 
“meaningful use,” ONC published a companion final rule that describes the 
standards, specification, and certification criteria for electronic health 
records that qualify for the Medicare and Medicaid EHR Incentive 
Programs.153  These rules were effective on August 27, 2010.154  Asserting 
that confidence in HIT systems is critical to advancing adoption, ONC 
emphasized that the purpose of the Permanent Certification Program is to: 
provide assurance to purchasers and other users that an EHR system, or 
other relevant technology, offers the necessary technological capability, 
 
 149. HITECH Act § 13101, 123 Stat. at 241 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-17). 
 150. Id. 
 151. HITECH Act § 13101, 123 Stat. at 240 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-14). 
 152. HITECH Act § 13101, 123 Stat. at 241 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300jj-16). 
 153. Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, Implementation 
Specifications, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record Technology, 75 Fed. 
Reg. 44,590 (July 28, 2010) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 170). 
 154. Id. 
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functionality, and security to help them meet the meaningful use criteria 
established for a given phase.155 
The certification rules specify the performance capabilities of EHR and 
include a set of certification standards related to drug-drug, drug-allergy 
and drug-formulary checking.156  According to the final rules, a certified 
EHR must include the following capabilities: 
(1) Notifications: automatically and electronically generate and indicate in 
real time notifications at the point of care for drug-drug and drug-allergy 
contraindications based on medication list, medication allergy list, and 
computerized provider order entry (CPOE). 
(2) Adjustments: provide certain users with the ability to adjust notifications 
provided for drug-drug and drug-allergy interaction checks.157 
The certification standard does not specify what the DDI list should be, but 
the final rules did address the inclusion of a means for adjusting the severity 
level for which alerts are presented.158  In explaining the change between 
the requirements in the proposed and final rules, the final rules state: 
With respect to customization, we sought to provide users of Certified EHR 
Technology with a way to adjust the severity level for which alerts are 
presented. In response to public comment, and to clarify what we believe 
Certified EHR Technology must include as a condition of certification, we 
have removed the “alert statistics” part of the certification criterion 
altogether and revised the “customization” part of the certification criterion 
to more clearly specify this capability. Our revisions focus on Certified EHR 
Technology’s capability to allow certain users (e.g., those with administrator 
rights) with the ability to adjust notifications provided for drug-drug and 
drug-allergy checks (e.g., set the level of severity).159 
The question pertinent to this article is whether the ONC has the authority to 
specify a consensus-driven, clinically significant DDI list as the standard DDI 
list for certified EHR. The HITECH Act appears to grant ONC broad 
authority to set standards and certification criteria, although endorsing a 
single DDI list appears to go beyond certifying functionalities and into 
certifying the content of a knowledge base that underlies an EHR function. 
 
 155. Certification Programs, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, http://healthit.hhs. 
gov/portal/server.pt/community/healthit_hhs_gov__certification_program/2884 (last visited 
Feb. 25, 2012). 
 156. Health Information Technology: Initial Set of Standards, Implementation 
Specifications, and Certification Criteria for Electronic Health Record Technology, 75 Fed. 
Reg. at 44,600. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 44601. 
 159. Id. 
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Strategy #5: Congress could create a statutory “safe harbor” for health care 
providers who adopt and use the approved DDI list. 
A safe harbor is generally defined as a regulation that reduces or 
eliminates liability under the law for excusable violations, provided the 
person or organization acted in good faith.160  The safe harbors with which 
most healthcare professionals are familiar are those promulgated by the 
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) to protect healthcare 
organizations from anti-trust violations under the Criminal Penalties for Acts 
Involving Federal Health Care Programs (known as the Anti-Kickback 
Statute), enacted by Congress in 1972.161  The statute was meant to prevent 
fraud and abuse in federal healthcare programs by assessing criminal 
penalties against individuals and entities that willingly provided bribes or 
kickbacks in order to generate business that would be reimbursed by federal 
healthcare programs such as Medicare and Medicaid.162 
Congress recognized, however, that the broad language of the statute 
might result in prosecution of health care providers for “innocuous and even 
beneficial arrangements” that were also prohibited under a literal reading of 
the statute.163 To address that possibility, fifteen years later, Congress 
enacted the Medicare and Medicaid Patient Protection Act which authorized 
HHS’ Office of the Inspector General to promulgate regulations that would 
provide exclusions for certain types of payment arrangements among health 
care providers.164 These exclusions, embedded in the regulations, are 
commonly called safe harbors.165 By promulgating the regulations, HHS 
created thirteen specific safe harbors.  In 1996, Congress created yet more 
safe harbors related to permissible remuneration by amending the anti-
kickback statute through passage of the Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act (“HIPAA”).166 
 
 160. While it is not clear in what context the concept of a “safe harbor” was first 
introduced, we found definitions of safe harbor in both the financial and real estate sectors, as 
well as in healthcare. 
 161. See Social Security Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 242, 86 Stat. 
1329, 1419-20 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395ii, 1396). Among its provisions, 
the statute requires that the party at issue, “knowingly and willingly” engage in the prohibited 
conduct.  Id. 
 162. Douglas A. Blair, The New Proposed Safe Harbors for Certain Managed Care Plans 
and Risk-Sharing Arrangements: A History, Analysis, and Comparison with Existing Safe 
Harbors and Federal Regulations, 9 HEALTH MATRIX 37, 39 (1999). 
 163. Id. 
 164. 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7d (2006). 
 165. Blair, supra note 162, at 39. 
 166. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
191, § 216, 110 Stat. 1936, 2007 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b). 
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Congress could authorize HHS to create a safe harbor to protect 
hospitals and health care providers who adopt and use a consensus-
developed, clinically significant DDI list.  In this case, Congress would not 
be protecting providers from prosecution under a statute that Congress itself 
had passed, but rather would be passing a statute that would result in 
protecting providers from liability under state tort law. 
A majority in Congress would have to be persuaded that the liability risk 
associated with the use of a clinically significant DDI list is a sufficiently 
important risk to health care providers that Congress should act to override 
state law.  One could anticipate that the state legislatures (and possibly the 
governors) would not support Congress usurping state authority over tort law 
within their borders.  For example, the National Conference of State 
Legislatures has criticized federal attempts at tort reform as an unnecessary 
intrusion on state lawmaking.167  But, it’s unlikely that a federal regulator 
could eliminate tort liability under state law without a specific federal statute 
to that end. 
The notion of a CDS liability safe harbor does not imply broad tort 
reform.  We are not suggesting that malpractice liability be eliminated, nor 
are we suggesting that physicians should have a free pass whenever they are 
managing medications, or even when using CPOE systems.  Rather, the 
intent would be to stipulate that where a physician has managed 
medications using CDS with a clinically significant DDI list, then the end 
user’s choice not to receive a more inclusive set of DDI warnings cannot 
itself be used as a basis for medical malpractice liability, or as evidence of 
negligence on the part of the physician or hospital.168 
Hospitals and other healthcare organizations could also be included 
under the language of the safe harbor because hospitals will likely be the 
buyers of CPOE systems, and implementers of the DDI lists: thus insulating 
them from liability may be important to promoting CDS adoption.  
Furthermore, if policymakers really want to make the safe harbor sufficiently 
 
 167. Deficit Reduction Talking Points, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, 
http://www.ncsl.org/state-federal-committees/taskforce/deficit-reductiontalking-points.aspx. 
 168. It is important to distinguish a safe harbor from a no-fault compensation program. 
For example, the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program was designed by Congress 
to protect vaccine manufacturers from product liability suits with the goal of improving vaccine 
availability in the United States. A no-fault compensation program–unlike a safe harbor– 
would substitute for the tort system by paying compensation to any one harmed, without 
requiring that the plaintiff prove causation. For a thorough discussion of the NVICP, see Derry 
Ridgway, No-Fault Vaccine Insurance: Lessons from the National Vaccine Injury Compensation 
Program, 24 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 59 (1999). Such a program is a potentially more 
complex and expensive undertaking than is a safe harbor, and in our judgment not narrowly 
tailored to the problem we are trying to fix. 
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airtight to fully encourage use of a consensus-developed, clinically 
significant DDI list, protection for CDS vendors might be added as well (i.e., 
the safe harbor could stipulate that CDS software that allows users to modify 
the scope of DDI alerting is not inherently defective, and that product 
liability claims against vendors on that basis will not be allowed.)  It would 
be fairly easy to write a safe-harbor provision that is tailored narrowly to 
protect physicians, hospitals and vendors as described above. Whether 
Congress would actually pass such a provision is another question. 
Developing a safe harbor like the one described above invites the 
question “what is a good DDI list?”  The answer would have to be specified 
in legislation or regulation, but probably reverts to: A DDI list is good if it is 
developed through formal expert-consensus process, endorsed by one or 
more medical professional societies, and certified or otherwise formally 
adopted by an appropriate government regulator, such as the ONC. 
The most important unanswered question is whether a safe harbor in this 
instance would be good policy.  As we have shown in this discussion, there 
is no compelling evidence–based on current case law and trial court 
decisions–that providers will be at any greater risk from using CDS with a 
clinically significant DDI list than exists currently.  Where is the justification, 
then, for Congressional action that would serve to override state tort law? 
IV.  SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Medication-related clinical decision support can reduce or prevent 
medication errors.  It is thus inherently liability reducing.  However, as a 
result of vendor concerns about liability, current CDS systems generate 
overly inclusive drug-drug interaction warnings that overwhelm physicians 
with clinically insignificant alerts, thus reducing patient safety and increasing 
physician liability. 
A key element in promoting adoption of CDS is to develop a clinically 
significant DDI list. As part of its mission, the ONC is supporting 
development of such a list that can be vetted for widespread adoption.  But 
unless liability concerns are addressed, vendors may be reluctant to 
implement the list in their systems, and physicians and institutions will be 
reluctant to adopt a CDS system that they perceive as exposing them to 
liability. 
A clinically significant DDI list, when implemented in CDS, will not 
increase liability for physicians, over the liability risk they already bear.  
Rather, the list would be potentially liability reducing – especially if it were 
endorsed or certified by a consensus of the professional medical community 
and by the relevant government agencies. 
There is no legal magic bullet that will give full liability protection to 
physicians and healthcare organizations that adopt and use a clinically 
significant DDI list.  To address this barrier, we offer five public policy 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
294 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY JOURNAL OF HEALTH LAW & POLICY [Vol. 5:257 
options that could help shield end users of CDS from liability.  ONC’s best 
option for promoting CDS will probably involve a combination of these, 
including development of a good, consensus based DDI list with widespread 
acceptance in the provider community; endorsement of the DDI list by 
appropriate professional organizations and government regulators; 
concomitant reductions in patient risk and provider liability by virtue of new 
CDS systems that use the DDI list; and protection of vendors against 
increased liability through government endorsement/certification of 
appropriate DDI and CDS, together with software contracts that include 
appropriate indemnification provisions. 
Under several of the policy options that we have assessed, the federal 
government would be required to endorse or certify a consensus based DDI 
list as a critical initial step to promote wider acceptance of the list, to create 
momentum for provider adoption of the list, and to shelter providers (and 
perhaps vendors) from any incidental liability risks that might otherwise 
attach.  One concern that might arise for ONC is whether endorsement or 
certification of a DDI list would create grounds for government liability, in 
the event that patients are injured when the list is subsequently used in CDS 
systems.  Although we cannot offer legal advice or provide a formal legal 
opinion on this question, superficially at least the answer appears to be no.  
Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States government is 
generally immune to tort claims, except in instances where it has waived that 
immunity.  Although the Federal Tort Claims Act waives government 
immunity in instances where federal employees are negligent within the 
scope of their employment, it seems unlikely that this waiver would apply to 
the issue of regulatory endorsement of a DDI list. 
Assuming that a government regulator like ONC has the power to 
endorse or certify a DDI list, and assuming that the agency exercises that 
power non-negligently, then the potential for civil liability under the Federal 
Tort Claims Act is low.  Clearly ONC will want to consult with its own 
counsel on this point, and perhaps investigate more deeply the contours of 
its own authority under existing law.  We think that government liability risk is 
likely to be the least of the challenges that need to be overcome in pressing 
the development of a good DDI list via regulatory endorsement or 
certification. 
We conclude with the observation that creating effective CDS with a 
consensus-driven, clinically relevant DDI list could have the additional 
advantage of moving the goal posts of medication management relative to 
the malpractice standard of care.169  Legal standards for negligence are set 
by state courts and legislatures, but the federal government and the medical 
 
 169. Mangalmurti et al., supra note 48, at 2064. 
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profession could strongly influence the standard of care against which 
medical practice is judged. We suspect that the end result for the medical 
community would be positive, affirming medication practices that are 
already widely accepted, while facilitating robust decision support that helps 
to prevent errors and the malpractice claims that spring from them. 
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